Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2015

The Integration of Environmental Law into International
Investment Treaties and Trade Agreements: Negotiation Process
and the Legalization of Commitments
Madison Condon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INTO
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND TRADE
AGREEMENTS: NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND THE
LEGALIZATION OF COMMITMENTS
Madison Condon*

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 103
A. Legalization ......................................................................... 104
B. Negotiation and process ...................................................... 105
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS .................. 106
A. Theory Behind Trade and Environment Linkages ............... 106
B. Development of Environmental Provisions in Free Trade
Agreements ......................................................................... 107
1. Early U.S. Practice ........................................................ 107
2. Second Phase of U.S. FTAs ............................................ 109
3. Recent U.S. Free Trade Agreements .............................. 110
4. U.S.-Peru FTA ................................................................ 111
5. Environmental Provisions in Non-U.S. FTAs ................ 114
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES ......................................................... 115
A. The Concept of Legalization ................................................ 115
B. The Legalization of Multilateral Environmental Treaties
via FTAs ............................................................................. 118
C. Implications of Legalization of Multilateral
Environmental Treaties ...................................................... 119
IV. LINKAGE OF INVESTMENT LAW AND ENVIRONMENT .................. 122
A. The U.S. Model BIT ............................................................. 122
B. Legalization of International Environmental Law via
BITs .................................................................................... 124
C. Implications in Investment Arbitration for the Inclusion
of MEAs: Environmental Rights of Actions for Investors .. 125
D. Corporate Social Responsibility.......................................... 126
V. WHY THESE PROVISIONS IN THESE TREATIES? A LOOK AT
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PROCESS ....................................... 128
A. Background on Process ....................................................... 129

*

J.D., Harvard University, 2014; M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014; B.S.,
Columbia University, 2008. The author thanks Professor Jeswald Salacuse for his comments on
earlier drafts.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693207

2015]

Integration of Environmental Law

103

1. 1990s: The Fight Over Trade Promotion Authority ...... 129
2. May 10 Agreement ......................................................... 132
B. Negotiation Theory and Environmental Priorities of
Trade Agreements .............................................................. 133
1. Theory of Two-Level Games .......................................... 133
2. Why MEAs? .................................................................... 134
3. Why Trade Agreements? ................................................ 136
a. Issue Linkage ............................................................ 136
b. Bilateral Bargaining ................................................ 138
c. BITSs v. FTAs as Vehicles for Environmental
Linkage ................................................................... 138
4. Coalitions ....................................................................... 139
a. Level II Coalitions .................................................... 139
b. Transnational Coalitions ......................................... 141
5. Why these MEAs? ........................................................... 142
VI. LOOKING AHEAD: ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN MEGATREATIES .................................................................................. 143
A. Trans-Pacific Partnership ................................................... 144
1. Expansion of Environmental Objectives ........................ 144
2. Climate ........................................................................... 145
3. TPA Remains Expired .................................................... 146
4. Multilateral Arena .......................................................... 147
B. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ......... 147
C. Current Consensus on Trade/Investment Linkages and
the Environment: Has it Worked? ...................................... 148
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 151
I. INTRODUCTION
There were seventeen international investment agreements (“IIAs”)
signed around the world in 2012, and each one of them contained some
provision relating to the protection of the environment.1 In comparison,
no investment treaty signed before 1985, and fewer than ten percent of
treaties signed between 1985 and 2001, contained any reference to the
environment at all.2 Environmental language has become increasingly


1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013 GLOBAL VALUE
CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 102, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2013,
U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.D.5 (2013).
2 Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International Investment
Agreements: The ‘New Era’ Has Commenced, but Harmonization Remains Far Off, COLUM. FDI
PERSP., Aug. 15, 2011, at 1.
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common in bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), and to an even greater
degree in other IIAs, such as free trade agreements (“FTAs”).3 The legal
implications of the integration of environmental law and norms into
investment law treaties have yet to be fully explored, though there has
been significant literature on trade and environment “linkages.” This
paper seeks to give a U.S.-centric overview of the recent trends in the
inclusion of environmental provisions in BITs and FTAs. In particular,
this paper focuses on the recognition and integration of multilateral
environmental agreements (“MEAs”) into the text of investment
agreements.
The analysis of this integration takes two approaches. In the first, the
international legal implications of the inclusion of MEAs into other
international treaties is aided by the concept of “legalization,” first
introduced in 2000 by Abbot et al., in which the “hard” or “soft” nature
of a legal norm is determined by the degree to which it possesses three
characteristics: obligation, precision, and delegation. The second
approach of the paper asks how and why these MEAs came to be
prioritized in the trade negotiations of the United States. The answer to
the question is found by applying theories of international negotiation,
primarily Robert Putnam’s theory of “two-level games,” to the history
of the development of environmental provisions of trade and investment
agreements.
Section II continues the introduction of the topic by presenting the
two main economic theories concerning the relationship between
liberalized trade and environmental impact: the Environmental Kuznets
Curve and the pollution haven hypothesis. It then presents the evolution
of environmental provisions in U.S. FTAs, starting with the NAFTA
side agreements in 1994 and culminating in the inclusion of MEAs in
the U.S.-Peru FTA in 2009.
A. Legalization
Section III introduces the concept of legalization in more detail and
uses it to describe the implications of the integration of multilateral
environmental agreements into the body of a free trade agreement. This
section looks, with a focus on the practices of the United States, at some
of the more innovative “linkages” between the environment and trade


3 Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International Investment
Agreements: A Survey 5 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Investment No. 2011/01), available at
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/environmental-concerns-in-internationalinvestment-agreements_5kg9mq7scrjh-en.
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and investment law. Some of these linkages push environmental norms
farther in the direction of “hard” legalization than ever before. They
increase the obligation upon states to create and enforce environment
laws; they often describe, with great precision, just how these laws are
to be implemented; and they increase the amount of delegation given to
third parties to determine compliance and resolve disputes. Some
thought is given to whether the institutions of international economic
law are truly the best fora for the enforcement of environmental norms.
Section IV focuses on changes in the Environment Article of the
2012 U.S. Model BIT and their potential implications for international
investment arbitration. The final example presented of the merging of
environmental and investment law is the recent trend toward the
inclusion of Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) provisions in both
BITs and FTAs.
Throughout its first half, this paper uses an
analysis of the changes in the characteristics of obligation, precision,
and delegation to describe the legal implications of these “linkages”
between environmental and economic law.
B. Negotiation and process
Section V seeks to answer the questions: ‘Why these provisions?’
and ‘Why these treaties?’ First, a close look at the policy and politics
behind these agreements is presented, with a focus on FTAs and the
“fast track” authority they require for a successful negotiation. Applying
theories of international negotiation, most significantly Putnam’s “twolevel game,” this section identifies the factors that account for the trade
and environment linkage outcomes outlined in the preceding sections.
These factors include: trade-offs resulting from linkage of international
issues; coalitions formed among domestic groups; transnational
coalitions formed between allied groups from different states at the
negotiation table; whether the agreement is bilateral or multilateral; and
the relative size of the domestic “win-sets.” Reference to Putnam’s
framework can be used to explain why the enforcement of the
Multilateral Environmental Agreements were included in the U.S.-Peru
Trade Agreement and why their enforcement in the upcoming TransPacific Partnership (“TPP”) is one of the largest remaining areas of
unresolved conflict in the negotiation.
Section VI looks ahead to mega-treaties such as the TPP, and applies
the lessons learned from Section V to explain the battles currently being
fought in secret over its environmental agenda. In this section, the
author also questions whether, empirically, environmental commitments
made under economic treaties have had positive effects.
Section VII concludes.
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. Theory Behind Trade and Environment Linkages
Concern over the relationship between trade and the environment,
and the theoretical literature that resulted from it, was sparked in the
early 1990s by two major developments in international law. The first
was the debate over the creation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and its predicted impacts.4 While the greatest
American opposition to NAFTA came from organized labor,
environmentalists also raised fears that unregulated polluting industries
would spring up and destroy Mexico’s natural resources.5 The second
event was a GATT panel ruling that the U.S. had violated its obligations
by banning imports of Mexican tuna, because the fish were caught in a
manner that harmed dolphins.6 The GATT laid the foundation for what
in 1993 was going to become the World Trade Organization, and there
was concern that international trade law would infringe upon the
sovereignty of individual nations to determine their own domestic
environmental regulation.7
To this day, there are two main theories regarding the effect of
liberalized trade on the environment: the Environmental Kuznets Curve
(“EKC”) and the pollution haven hypothesis. The Kuznets Curve refers
to the upside-down U-shaped relationship between income inequality
and levels of income first hypothesized in 1955: as poor countries
become rich, inequality among the population grows at first, but then
begins to decrease past a certain threshold.8 In 1993 two economists
proposed that this relationship also existed between income and
environmental degradation. 9 The EKC describes the fact that richer


4 See KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: MEXICO, NAFTA, AND
BEYOND (2004).
5 Id. at 1; Judith Adler Hellman, Mexican Perceptions of Free Trade: Support and Opposition
to NAFTA, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 193, 194 (Ricardo
Grinspun & Maxwell A. Cameron eds., 1993).
6 Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3
1991). The ruling circulated in 1991 but was not adopted. For a discussion of this case, see
Mexico Etc. v. US: ‘Tuna-Dolphin’, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/e
nvir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). See also Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the TradeEnvironment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 114 (2001).
7 Esty, supra note 6, at 113–14.
8 Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, XLV Am. Econ. Rev. (1995).
9 Gene Grossman & Alan Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade
Agreement, in THE MEXICO-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 13, 15, 31 (1993); GALLAGHER, supra
note 4, at 4–5.
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countries (like the United States) can afford to prioritize environmental
protection.
The pollution haven hypothesis refers to the fact that it is cheaper to
operate industry (and pollute) in a country that lacks environmental
regulation. As a result there is an economic incentive for industry to flee
from rich countries into poor countries once barriers to trade are
removed.10
This paper holds that these two theories are embedded in much of the
debate around the role of environmental provisions in trade agreements
to this day. Many environmental groups either oppose free trade entirely
or insist that agreements must only be signed with countries whose
domestic regulations have been elevated to sufficient standards. Pure
free-tradists argue that, “trade-generated wealth is a more powerful
vehicle for change than forcing standards on a nation.”11
This latter view echoes the sovereignty concerns that arose out of the
GATT Tuna-Dolphin decision. Opponents of environmental provisions
in trade agreements—including potential FTA partners of the United
States—”fear that developing countries could be required to implement
rules that are inappropriate for their level of development.”12
B. Development of Environmental Provisions in Free Trade Agreements
What follows is a brief overview of the changes in the environmental
provisions of U.S. Trade Agreements, staring with NAFTA in 1993 and
ending with a detailed description of the legal obligations entailed by
the U.S.-Peru FTA, concluded in 2006. For the purposes of comparison,
a brief sampling of environmental provisions in non-U.S. FTAs follows.
The policy and politics guiding these developments are presented later
in Section V.
1. Early U.S. Practice
NAFTA was the first United States trade agreement to explicitly
include environment provisions. Partially in response to the controversy
that had developed over the GATT Tuna/Dolphin dispute, NAFTA
reproduced the GATT Article XX environmental exceptions within its
text. In addition, the treaty included a list of three multilateral


10 KYM ANDERSON & RICHARD BLACKHURST, THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES 8
(1992).
11 Charan Devereaux et al., Fast Track/Trade Promotion Authority, in CASE STUDIES IN US
TRADE NEGOTIATION, VOLUME 1: MAKING THE RULES 208 (2006).
12 Id. at 190.
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environmental agreements that were meant to be given precedent over
NAFTA in the event that a conflict of norms arose in a dispute,
“provided that the MEA is implemented in the least NAFTAinconsistent manner.” 13 These treaties were: the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(“CITES”); the Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(“Montreal Protocol”); and the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.14
This recognition of even a limited set of MEAs was a significant
departure from the previous FTA that the U.S. had signed with Israel in
1985, in which the obligations under the FTA were given clear
precedence over all other agreements:
The Parties affirm their respective rights and obligations with respect
to each other under existing bilateral and multilateral agreements. . . . In
the event of an inconsistency between provisions of this Agreement and
such existing agreements, the provisions of this Agreement shall
prevail.15
The strength and relevance of NAFTA’s inclusion of environmental
exceptions and reference to privileged MEAs has been widely debated.
Environmental groups take issue in particular with the way in which
dispute settlement tribunals established under the Investment Chapter of
NAFTA have interpreted and enforced international environmental
norms. In the case of Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunal
engaged in no discussion of the environmental provisions provided
under NAFTA before ruling against Mexico’s “environmental”
measures.16 In the S.D. Myers v. Canada award, the arbitrators found
that while Canada was attempting to fulfill its obligations under The
Basel Convention on the Movement of Transboundary Wastes (one of


13 MARY TIEMANN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE , NAFTA: RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND
INITIATIVES (Mar. 2000), http://fpc.state.gov/6143.htm.
14 Id.; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M 1550 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol]; The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 676 U.N.T.S 126 [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
15 United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Isr., art. 3, Apr. 22, 1985, Hein’s No.
KAV 7204.
16 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug.
30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002).
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the three protected MEAs), it should have done so in a manner that was
more consistent with NAFTA investment rules.17
Most of NAFTA’s environmental provisions are contained within a
side agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (“NAAEC”). The NAAEC contains a dispute resolution
chapter, though the dispute resolution process differs significantly from
the process contained in the main agreement.18 Under the NAAEC, one
state party may allege that another state party has failed to enforce a
domestic environmental law and convene an arbitral panel to investigate
the violation. The panel may then impose a “monetary enforcement
assessment,” capped at twenty million dollars, or .007% of the value of
the trade between the two parties in the most recent year, and create an
“action plan” for the violating state.19 One unique aspect of this fine is
that it is paid directly to the Environmental Commission established
under the NAAEC and then spent as the Commission sees fit to improve
“environmental law enforcement” in the violating state.20 These dispute
settlement provisions have never been invoked by any of the three state
parties (See Section VI).21
2. Second Phase of U.S. FTAs
The next generation of U.S. FTAs merged the environmental side
agreements into the main text and created full and separate
Environmental Chapters within the treaties. 22 Free trade agreements
with Australia (2005), Morocco (2004), Bahrain (2004), and Oman
(2009) all establish dispute resolution for environmental matters in the
form of state-state consultation, contain strengthened provisions for
public participation, and note the importance of multilateral


17 S.D. Myers v. Canada, UNCITRAL, First Partial Award, ¶ 221 (Nov. 13, 2000),
http://italaw.com/documents/SDMeyers-1stPartialAward.pdf.
18 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 4–Sept.
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
19 Kevin W. Patton, Note, Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 87, 106 (1994) (citing NAAEC Annex
34(1)).
20 Id. (citing NAAEC Annex 34(3)).
21 GALLAGHER, supra note 4, at 77.
22 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, ch. 19, June 6, 2003, Hein’s No.
KAV 6375 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement]; United States-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, U.S-Sing., ch. 18, May 6, 2003, Hein’s No. KAV 6376 [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore
Free Trade Agreement]. See generally Sikina Jinnah & Julia Kennedy, Environmental Provisions
in US Trade Agreements: A New Era of Trade-Environment Politics, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. &
INT’L REL. 95, 98 (2011).

110

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 33:102

environmental agreements. 23 In addition to these developments, the
Chile FTA (2004) and Dominican Republic-Central America FTA
(“DR-CAFTA”) (2006) create Environmental Affairs Councils to
oversee the cooperation on environmental programs and also establish
rosters of environmental experts to serve as panelists in disputes arising
under the Environment Chapter.24 Dispute settlement procedures that
could result in tariff suspensions are provided if a state was found to
have failed to enforce domestic environmental laws.
3. Recent U.S. Free Trade Agreements
On May 10, 2007 a Bipartisan Trade Deal was reached between U.S.
Congressional and Senate leadership in consultation with the U.S. Trade
Representative.25 The May 10 Agreement, which is discussed in more
detail later in the paper, was necessitated by the fact that there were four
pending free trade agreements that would not be approved by the newly
Democratically-controlled Congress without certain pro-labor and
environment amendments.26 The Agreement effectively ratified the old
Congressional trade policy agenda that had been outlined in the Trade
Promotion Authority special legislation in 2002.27 Under the trade deal,
all U.S. FTAs must “incorporate a specific list of [seven] multilateral
environmental agreements,” all of which the United States is a signatory
to.28 The non-derogation obligation for domestic environmental laws
was amended from a “strive to” to a “shall” obligation.29 The most


23 United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, Hein’s No.
KAV 7141 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2005); United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Morocco, June 15, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 7206 (entered into force Sept. 1, 2004); United StatesBahrain Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 6866; Agreement
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 8673
(entered into force Jan. 1, 2009).
24 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art.17.5,
Aug. 5, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 7157; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 22, art.
19.03.
25 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL (2007)
[hereinafter USTR TRADE FACTS], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/200
7/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf.
26 David A. Gantz, The “Bipartisan Trade Deal,” Trade Promotion Authority and the Future
of U.S. Free Trade Agreements 6, 12 (Ariz. Legal Stud., Discussion Paper No. 08–16, 2008).
27 Trade Promotion Authority, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–13 (2006) (expired Jun. 30, 2007). See also
Gantz, supra note 26, at 3.
28 USTR TRADE FACTS, supra note 25, at 3 (“The list, with abbreviated titles, is as follows:
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), Montreal Protocol on Ozone
Depleting Substances, Convention on Marine Pollution, Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Convention (IATTC), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, International Whaling Convention
(IWC), and Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).”).
29 Id. at 2.
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significant modification from past policy was the stipulation that all
FTA environmental obligations “will be enforced on the same basis as
the commercial provisions of our agreements—same remedies,
procedures, and sanctions.” 30 The May 10 Agreement explicitly
encouraged the use of trade sanctions instead of fines in the
enforcement of environmental obligations—including those obligations
arising under the listed MEAs.31
There are four FTAs that have been completed since the creation of
the Bipartisan Trade Deal: Peru, Colombia, South Korea, and Panama.
Each contains reference to this list of seven “covered agreements.”32
Under the text of the treaties, actions taken in pursuit of compliance
with the MEAs are not merely protected in the event that they conflict
with an investment or trade law norm. Rather, the FTAs mandate the
implementation of the listed MEAs. The Environmental Chapter overall
is linked quite tightly with the main Dispute Settlement Chapter of the
FTAs. While the U.S.-Chile FTA in 2004 was the first agreement to
permit dispute settlement mechanisms for the derogation from a state’s
own domestic environmental laws, these new FTAs expand the
application of dispute settlement to the entire Environment Chapter.33
The four most recent FTAs provide for broad use of trade sanctions in
disciplining states that derogate from their domestic environmental law
or from the list of MEAs.34
4. U.S.-Peru FTA
The 2009 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (“TPA”) has gone
the farthest in implementing what Jinnah and Morgera call “innovations
in trade-environment linkages.”35 Its Environment Chapter contains a


Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2–3.
32 United States-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-South Korea, art. 20-A, Mar. 15,
2012, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/finaltext; United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, annex 18.2, Apr. 12, 2006,
Hein’s No. KAV 8674 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement]; United States-Panama Trade Promotion, U.S.-Pan., annex 17.2, June 28, 2007,
Hein’s No. KAV 9546; United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Colom., annex 18.2,
May 15, 2012, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombi
a-fta/final-text.
33 U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 22.
34 DEP’T OF STATE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Nov. 20, 2007),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96035.pdf.
35 Sikina Jinnah & Elisa Morgera, Environmental Provisions in American and EU Free Trade
Agreements: A Preliminary Comparison and Research Agenda, REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L
ENVTL. L. 324, 329 (2012).
30
31
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unique article on biodiversity, it provides for expansive dispute
settlement for a number of environmental conflicts, and it contains an
Annex on Forest Governance that authorizes unprecedented U.S.
supervision of the enforcement of Peruvian law.
Article 18.11 on Biological Diversity contains mostly weak, nonbinding obligations. The Parties “recognize the importance of . . .
conservation” and “remain committed to promoting and encouraging the
conservation . . . of biological diversity.”36 The Parties also “recognize
the importance of public participation and consultations, as provided by
domestic law” and “will enhance their cooperative efforts . . . through
the [Environmental Affairs Council]” created under the Environment
Chapter.37 What is remarkable about this article is that the provisions are
quite similar to the commitments created under the Convention on
Biological Diversity (“CBD”), a treaty to which the United States
declined to become a party.38 Jinnah reports that in a private interview a
U.S. government representative admitted that there were political
concerns that “the U.S. not effectively ratify the CBD through an
FTA.”39
The U.S.-Peru TPA’s Annex on Forest Sector Governance governs
specifically the implementation and enforcement of a particular MEA:
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Flora and Fauna (“CITES”).40 The eight-page Annex, contained within
the Environmental Chapter of the TPA, is explicitly subject to Dispute
Settlement under Chapter 21 of the TPA.41 The document outlines in
detail the steps that Peru alone must take in order to combat illegal
logging practices. These steps include passing new regulations on illegal
logging, establishing export quotas on mahogany, and increasing
criminal penalties for violations of forestry laws. 42 In addition, the
Annex requires that Peru allow officials from the United States to
participate in the auditing and verification of compliance of Peruvian
wood exporters.43
These enforcement measures are stronger than any provided for
under CITES itself. Indeed, Peru has been a signatory to CITES since


U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11.
Id.
38 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, Hein’s No. KAV 3747.
39 Jinnah & Morgera, supra note 35, at 329 (citing to a personal interview with a U.S.
government representative in January 2010).
40 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, annex. 18.3.4.
41 Id. art. 21.2.
42 Id. annex. 18.3.4.
43 Id.
36
37
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1975 and had sat comfortably in noncompliance for three decades prior
to the signing of the TPA.44 The United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”) has made it clear that the TPA “commits Parties to adopt,
maintain and implement laws and all other measures to fulfill
obligations under covered multilateral environmental agreements,
including CITES. Along with other obligations in the Environment
Chapter . . . this obligation is subject to the PTPA’s dispute settlement
procedures and enforcement mechanisms.”45
The entry into force of the U.S.-Peru TPA was only the beginning of
the United States’ involvement in Peruvian environmental law. In order
to come into compliance with the provisions of the TPA (not just the
Environment Chapter), Peru was required pass nearly one hundred new
laws.46 In order to meet the eighteen-month timeline stipulated under the
TPA, the Peruvian Congress granted President Alan García the
equivalent of “fast-track” authority to rapidly enact a block of
legislation known as the “99 decrees.” 47 “[T]wo teams of U.S.
government lawyers” as well as representatives from the USTR flew to
Peru to help with the drafting of these laws, including forestry laws and
changes to indigenous land ownership.48 This assistance in the drafting
of legislation was also accompanied by millions of dollars in “trade
capacity building assistance” from the U.S. government. 49 These
changes were met with a mixed response from Peruvian citizens.
Environmental activists claimed that some of the legal changes would
hurt, rather than help forest preservation, making it easy for indigenous
groups to sell off their lands for the establishment of biofuel
plantations.50


44 Jinnah & Kennedy, supra note 22, at 102–03; List of Contracting Parties, CONVENTION ON
INT’L TRADE ENDANGERED SPECIES WILD FAUNA & FLORA, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/partie
s/chronolo.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
45 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW UNITED STATES-PERU
TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT 21 (2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/
2559.
46 Erik Wasson, New Peru FTA Decrees Anger Civil Society Over Labor, Environment,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 4, 2008.
47 Jinnah & Kennedy, supra note 22, at 105.
48 Wasson, supra note 46.
49 Id.
50 Id.; TRAVIS MCARTHUR & TODD TUCKER, PUBLIC CITIZEN, A YEAR AFTER
IMPLEMENTATION OF PERU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, U.S. AND PERU LEFT WITH BROKEN
PROMISES AND NO NEW TRADE MODEL (2010), http://www.citizen.org/documents/peruftaoneyear.pdf.
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Indeed, by June 2009 demonstrations by indigenous peoples and
farmers against the unwanted “jungle laws” had become violent.51 One
confrontation resulted in the deaths of thirty-four police and civilians.52
In response, the Peruvian legislature voted to repeal the two decrees
intended to change the regulation of forest wildlife.53 President García
issued a statement admitting that; “his government had made a mistake
by failing to consult with indigenous communities before passing [ten]
decrees that modified Peru’s legal and regulatory framework on access
to and use of natural resources in the country’s Amazon jungle
region.”54
As of August 2010, Peru had failed to meet a deadline for
implementing further legal reforms established under the Forest
Annex.55 In response, USTR representatives traveled to Lima to discuss
compliance, meeting not only with counterparts in the executive branch,
but also with members of Peru’s congress to discuss a new forestry law,
which a government source described to Inside U.S. Trade as an
“unusual” step.56 Environmental groups in the U.S. issued statements
that they would expect the U.S. to initiate dispute settlement
proceedings under the TPA unless Peru made “significant progress” on
its forestry obligations.57 A U.S. House of Representatives Ways and
Means Committee member supported the use of formal dispute
settlement.58
5. Environmental Provisions in Non-U.S. FTAs
Jinnah and Morgera provide a comprehensive analysis of the
European Union approach to the incorporation of MEAs in FTAs,
which offers a useful tool for comparison. 59 The E.U. Peru and
Colombia (“EU-COPE”) FTA also contains a list of seven “covered”
multilateral agreements, to which “[t]he Parties reaffirm their


51 Ángel Páez, PERU: Congress Probes Massacre; Prime Minister to Quit, INT’L PRESS
SERVICE (June 16, 2009), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47248.
52 Id.
53 Ángel Páez, PERU: Government Partly Backs Down in Standoff with Native Groups, INT’L
PRESS SERVICE (June 19, 2009), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47297.
54 Id.
55 Kirk Sending Senior USTR Official to Lima After Peru Misses FTA Deadline, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Aug. 6, 2010.
56 Matthew Schewel, U.S. Presses Peru to Approve Controversial Forestry Law by MidDecember, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 2010.
57 Id.
58 Kirk Sending Senior USTR Official to Lima After Peru Misses FTA Deadline, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Aug. 6, 2010.
59 Jinnah & Morgera, supra note 35, at 329–33.
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commitment to effectively implement in their laws and practices . . . .”60
The E.U. list includes more of the “major” MEAs currently in force,
covering chemicals, hazardous waste, biodiversity, and climate change,
but leaving out tuna, whaling, and Antarctic marine life. EU-COPE
creates a dispute settlement procedure to cover its Trade and Sustainable
Development Chapter, which is distinct from the dispute settlement
provided for under the rest of the Agreement.61 Under this procedure,
the Parties “shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory
resolution of the matter through dialogue and [state-state]
consultations.”62 Disputes unable to be resolved through consultation
may be brought in front of a panel of environmental experts, who may
issue a non-binding report with recommendations.63
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES
The preceding section described the growth of the scope of the
environmental provisions in free trade agreements. The following
section investigates the international legal implications of such growth.
These provisions have been increasing the number of state obligations
as well as strengthening their ability to be enforced—they have been
following a course of “legalization.”
A. The Concept of Legalization
In 2000, Abbot et al. surveyed recent developments in international
affairs and noted that institutions and norms had been following a trend
of “legalization”—where subject areas previously dominated by
diplomacy and politics were increasing governed by new international
institutions with legal bite.64 The growing use and effectiveness of the
WTO, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International


60 Free Trade Agreement between the E.U. and Its Member States, of the One Part, and
Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, art. 270.2, Jun. 26 2012, available at http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf [hereinafter EU-COPE FTA]. For the Agreements
see Montreal Protocol, supra note 14; Basel Convention, supra note 14; Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119; Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208; Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303
U.N.T.S. 148; Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337.
61 EU-COPE FTA, supra note 60, art. 285.
62 Id. art. 283.
63 Id. art. 284.
64 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000).
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were all part of this
trend.65 One key example cited was that U.S. courts had recently upheld
the constitutionality of the use of binding dispute resolution under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), declining to find
that the determinations of an international tribunal violated U.S.
sovereignty.66
Abbot et al. define “legalization” as “a particular set of characteristics
that institutions may (or may not) possess.”67 These characteristics are
aligned along three axes: obligation, precision, and delegation. 68
Obligation refers to the legally binding nature of the commitment in
question. 69 This means that there are procedures in place—under
international law or domestic law—to analyze whether or not a state or
other actors are in compliance. 70 Precision refers to the detail with
which the obligated conduct is described.71 Delegation refers to the
degree to which third parties have been granted the authority to
determine and enforce the compliance as well as the power to resolve
disputes. 72 The amount by which each of the properties are, in
combination, maximized or minimized results in “hard” or “soft”
legalization of a norm. 73 These labels are not meant to be binary;
institutions can be located on an “identifiable continuum from hard law
to varied forms of soft law.”74
The rise of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) and free trade
agreements (“FTAs”) can be described in these terms. In terms of
obligation, these treaties create binding legal rules rather than expressly
non-legal standards. The rules contained within them are precise rather
than vague principles. The method for resolving disputes under these
treaties is, with some exception, binding dispute resolution delegated to
an independent tribunal. The international legal community has, for the
most part, embraced this legalization trend. The number of BITs on
record has multiplied over the years such that there were 2,857 in force


65 Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385,
385 (2000).
66 Id. (citing Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala.
1999)).
67 Abbott et al., supra note 64, at 401.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 401–402.
74 Id. at 418.
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at the end of 2012.75 Nearly all states have at least one BIT. In addition,
there are 339 “other” international investment agreements, such as free
trade agreements with investment chapters.76 There were fifty-eight new
investor-state claims initiated under such investment treaties in 2012.77
This paper looks not at the increasing use of BITs and FTAs, but
rather at the expansion in their scope. Specifically of interest is the
incorporation of environmental norms in explicitly legal terms into the
treaty texts. International economic law fora, namely the WTO and the
investment arbitration system, have had great success in the hardening
of all three legalization properties: obligation, precision, and delegation.
States, with a few infamous exceptions, have typically complied with an
ICSID award against them.78 This success has prompted many proposals
for the expansion of subject areas that the dispute adjudication bodies
are granted the competence to resolve. Many advocates bemoan the lack
of teeth in other international treaties and support borrowing the
adjudication and enforcement mechanisms of international economic
law.79 Noah Feldman, for example, has proposed that state violators of
human rights should be brought in front of the WTO, judged, and
punished through trade sanctions. 80 Some proposals argue that the
expansion of the competence of arbitrators and the types of claims heard
in investment arbitral tribunals is necessary to counteract investor-bias.81
To other observers of the investment law system, it seems inevitable
that questions of environmental law will arise out of investment
disputes, so the hierarchy of international norms ought to be made more
explicit.82


U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 1.
Id. at xix.
77 Id. at 110.
78 Dany Khayat, Enforcement of Awards in ICSID Arbitration, INT’L ARB. PERSP. ON
ENFORCEMENT, Winter 2012, at 15, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/b
3dde3c6-d268-49a6-840d-5022ca866c0b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d94cda79-2ee8-44
7c-b205-54ca37390ece/11986.PDF#page=18.
79 Jorge E. Viñuales, The Environment Breaks into Investment Disputes 5 (2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125209.
80 Noah Feldman, How Guantanamo Affects China: Our Human Rights Hypocrisies, SALON
(May 19, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/05/19/how_guantanamo_affects_china_our_human_
rights_hypocrisies/ (arguing that “. . . economic interdependence can be leveraged to help manage
real political conflict.”).
81 Kate Supnik, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing
Interests in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 343, 343–44, 346–47 (“Amending the
ICSID Convention to include a provision allowing tribunals to consider environmental, public
health, and labor concerns would serve as a positive step toward establishing an investment
regime that maximizes the interests of investors and host states alike”).
82 Lise Johnson, International Investment Agreements and Climate Change: The Potential for
Investor-State Conflicts and Possible Strategies for Minimizing It, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11147
75
76
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B. The Legalization of Multilateral Environmental Treaties via FTAs
Through the mechanism of a Free Trade Agreement, the United
States has been able to effectively enforce, in the territory of another
state, a multilateral environmental treaty that on its own had much
weaker compliance provisions. Through this process, which Jinnah
labels “regulatory transference,” the three characteristics of legalization
were each substantially increased. 83 Peru took on even greater
obligations with regard to the regulation of mahogany exports than were
required by CITES alone.84 In the realm of precision, Peru agreed not
only to implement very specific monitoring and regulation of its
rainforests, but also to enact specific laws co-written by the United
States regarding forest governance. The third characteristic of
delegation was perhaps maximized to the greatest degree. The
compliance or non-compliance of Peru with the CITES provisions that
were incorporated into the FTA can now be determined through
international arbitration under the FTA Dispute Settlement mechanisms.
The United States can issue trade sanctions against Peru if it fails to
meet its CITES-like obligations. It has become clear in the years since
the entry into force of the FTA that the conflict never needs to reach the
formal dispute resolution stage for the mandates of the FTA to exercise
great influence over Peru’s behavior.85 Indeed, U.S. officials have made
several trips to Peru to demonstrate exactly how to implement and
enforce the new land management laws. They are permitted under the
FTA to conduct their own unannounced audits of timber exports, and
the U.S. Forestry Service maintains an office in Lima “devoted to
supporting Peru’s efforts to implement the Forest Annex.”86 When Peru
failed to meet an FTA-imposed deadline regarding the passage of new
forestry regulation, officials from the U.S. government had the power to
meet with members of the Peruvian congress and assist them in meeting
that deadline.87


(2009); Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the
Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345 (2007).
83 Sikina Jinnah, Strategic Linkages: The Evolving Role of Trade Agreements in Global
Environmental Governance, 20 J. Env’t & Dev. 191, 194 (2011).
84 Jinnah & Morgera, supra note 35, at 330–31.
85 Wasson, supra note 46.
86 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT:
STRENGTHENING FOREST SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN PERU 2 (2013), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013-Progress-under-the-Forest-Annex.pdf.
87 Kirk Sending Senior USTR Official to Lima After Peru Misses FTA Deadline, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Aug. 6, 2010.
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C. Implications of Legalization of Multilateral Environmental Treaties
The first concern raised is the ability of an economic superpower to
set the environmental agenda of a developing nation through the carrot
and stick coercion of a free trade agreement. Lack of sovereignty over
natural resources is an ancient grievance of developing nations against
the developed world.88 Interestingly, the first article of the Environment
Chapter of the U.S.-Peru TPA itself provides that both Parties recognize
the “sovereign right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic
environmental protection and environmental development priorities, and
to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and policies.”89
The Forestry Annex and its process of implementation seem to cut
against these principles. Indeed, Peru has spent significant resources and
manpower implementing the exact forestry reforms that it had been
comfortable ignoring under CITES.90 The intense public opposition to
the changes made in indigenous land rights through the implementation
of the FTA demonstrates that these reforms may be what the American
people think is important—but not the Peruvian people.
One might ask, how much do Americans really care about the illegal
trade in mahogany? Is it a significant enough priority to the American
people to warrant U.S. Trade Representatives flying to Lima to oversee
the drafting of forestry laws? Or, is it possible that there are a small
number of individuals and NGOs with lobbying power who care a great
deal about the preservation of the mahogany species and the United
States Congress does not care much either way? These questions are
addressed again in Section V, which investigates the domestic politics
and coalitions that worked toward the inclusion of FTAs in the May 10
Agreement.
All seven MEAs are treaties to which the United States is a party, but
they are also all treaties with which the U.S. is comfortably in
compliance. From the perspective of an environmentalist, the seven
treaties contained within the EU-COPE FTA represent a collection of
the most “major” MEAs. Several of these treaties are ones that the U.S.
has not yet ratified. The Rotterdam Convention on Chemicals has been
ratified by 153 states and the E.U., but not the U.S. 91 The Basel


88 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 15
(Dec. 14, 1962).
89 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11.
90 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-161, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS MONITORING OF
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 11–12 (2014).
91 Status of Ratifications, ROTTERDAM CONVENTION, http://www.pic.int/Countries/Statusofra
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Convention has been ratified by almost every state other than Haiti and
the United States.92 The United States, South Sudan and Andorra are the
only states not to have ratified the Kyoto Protocol (though Canada
renounced its ratification in 2011).93
Some have hailed the inclusion of MEAs in recent U.S. FTAs as the
assertion of the role of the United States as a global environmental
leader. It is true that by subjecting compliance with the MEAs to the
scrutiny and enforcement of the dispute settlement, the U.S. has given
them far more “legal bite” than any of the treaties had on their own.
This new generation of FTAs advances the legalization of these
environmental norms far beyond the mere recognition first given to
them under NAFTA. Indeed, in the introduction to Legalization and
World Politics, the authors pointed to NAFTA’s environmental
provisions as an example of a weakly legalized institution, writing,
“NAFTA’s transgovernmental Commission on Environmental
Cooperation ‘is too weak to create the pressures necessary to cause
substantial redrafting of environmental legislation’ and is useful largely
as a device for disseminating information about effective domestic
environmental law.”94 In contrast, the U.S.-Peru FTA, as we have seen,
resulted in concrete changes to Peruvian environmental law.
However one must ask what exactly we are gaining by having the
United States pick and choose the environmental priorities of the rest of
the world, or at least the states it can coerce through economic fora. Had
Peru attempted to use the FTA to impose climate change mitigation
legislation upon the United States through a linkage with the Kyoto
Protocol, it certainly would have failed. As Goldstein et al. point out,
“[t]o the degree that legalization represents rules that do bind at least
some governments, the realist explanation is clear: legal rules emanate
from dominant powers and represent their interests.”95
A second and related concern about this method of “hardening”
international environmental law has to do with transparency and the
democratic process. Peruvian President García was able to push though
controversial land reform laws without stakeholder consultation because


tifications/tabid/1072/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
92 Paul Hagen, It’s Past Time for the United States to Ratify the Basel Convention, 27 ENVTL.
F. 51, 51 (2010); Parties to the Convention, BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/Countries/
StatusofRatifications/PartiesSignatories#a-note-1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
93 TERESA M. THORP, CLIMATE JUSTICE: A VOICE FOR THE FUTURE 239 (2014).
94 Goldstein et al., supra note 65, at 391 (citing Kal Raustiala, International “Enforcement of
Enforcement” Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J.
INT’L L. 721, 760–61 (1996)).
95 Id. at 391.
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he had been given a form of “fast track” authority to enact legislation
necessary to comply with the mandate of the TPA. Public Citizen has
accused the USTR of assisting García in making an “end-run around
[his] constituents.”96 They point to a statement made by U.S. Trade
Representative Susan Schwab regarding the Peruvian decrees:
What free trade agreements enable a country to do, and I am
talking about the United States and its trading partner, is
implement reforms that we should probably be doing anyway
but that could be difficult politically. Part of our effort is
working with Peruvian authorities to help them get there.97

This situation, in which the domestic negotiators are played against the
international negotiators, is described well by Robert Putnam’s theory
of “two-level games,” and will be applied in Section V.98
It is important to note that the power of trade treaties to circumvent
the democratic process is present in the United States in addition to its
developing country trading partners. This power can be seen in the
concerns raised regarding the Biodiversity Article contained with the
Environment Chapter of the U.S.-Peru FTA. 99 The Article, while
composed of hortatory language, replicates many of the goals outlined
in the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”). Every U.N. state
member is a party to the CDB, with the exception of two: Andorra and
the United States.100 While the Senate declined to ratify the CBD in
1994,101 they did subsequently ratify many of its provisions through the
ratification of the Peru FTA.102
Further implications of the inclusion of MEAs in U.S. free trade
agreements, particularly their relevance to dispute resolution provided
under investment chapters, will be explored in the discussion of
environmental provisions in recent bilateral investment treaties below.


MCARTHUR & TUCKER, supra note 50, at 4.
Id. (citing Lucien Chauvin, Peru, U.S. Officials Work on Implementing Bilateral FTA, Aim
for Jan. 1 Effective Date, BNA, June 3, 2008) (emphasis added).
98 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
99 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11.
100 List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/information
/parties.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
101 DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, THE UNITED STATES AND
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.defenders.org/publications/the_u.s._a
nd_the_convention_on_biological_diversity.pdf.
102 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11.
96
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IV. LINKAGE OF INVESTMENT LAW AND ENVIRONMENT
Many states have included positive environmental provisions in their
bilateral investment treaties or the investment chapters of free trade
agreements. 103 A report released in 2011 by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) provides a
comprehensive survey of these provisions.104 The authors divide the
wide variety of approaches into seven categories: 1. General references
to environmental concerns in preambles; 2. Right to regulate—reserving
policy space for environmental regulation; 3. Reserving policy space
with respect to certain treaty provisions; 4. Precluding nondiscriminatory regulation as a basis for claims of indirect expropriation;
5. Environmental matters and investor-state dispute settlement; 6. Not
lowering standards—discouraging relaxation of environmental
standards to attract investment; and 7. General promotion of progress in
105
environmental
protection
and
cooperation.
The
Belgium/Luxembourg-Colombia BIT takes a different approach and
removes environment-related disputes entirely from investor-state
dispute resolution. 106 Notably, the 2004 Canadian Model Foreign
Investment Protection Agreement was the first to directly incorporate
general exceptions akin to GATT Article XX and the BIT practice of
many other countries has followed suit.107
This paper now turns to present the changes to the Environment
Article that were made in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and analyze their
implications for international investment law.
A. The U.S. Model BIT
In April 2012 the United States government released the newly
revised version of its model bilateral investment treaty. It was a long
time in the making—the previous version of the model BIT had been
released in 2004. Overall, the two versions differed only slightly,


Gordon & Pohl, supra note 3, at 5–6.
Id.
105 Id.
106 Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one hand, and the
Republic of Colombia, on the other hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, art. 8, Apr. 2, 2009, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/T
reatyFile/342.
107 Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 354, 357–58 (Marie-Claire
Cordonier et al. eds., 2011); see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008–
June
2009,
Recent
Developments
in
International
Investment
Agreements,
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/0 (2009).
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disappointing both industry and advocacy groups who had been pushing
for more significant changes. 108 The new model BIT did, however,
contain a substantially strengthened Investment and Environment
Article which increases commitments to environmental protection in
several ways. The 2004 model provided that “each Party shall strive to
ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from [its
environmental laws] in a manner that weakens or reduces the
protections afforded in those laws, as an encouragement for the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in
its territory.” 109 In the new 2012 model, the phrase “shall strive to
ensure” was replaced with “shall ensure,” and an additional
commitment not to “fail to effectively enforce” environment laws was
added.110 A new clause starting the Article was added, stating that the
Parties “recognize that their respective environmental laws and policies,
and multilateral environmental agreements to which they are both
party, play an important role in protecting the environment.” The Labor
and Investment Article similarly references a commitment to the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) Declaration.111 This is the first
time a revised U.S. model BIT has made explicit reference to external
multilateral agreements in these areas.
While the 2004 model had provided for state-state consultation if one
Party believed the other to be derogating from domestic environmental
law,112 the new consultation provision was expanded to apply to the
entire Environment Article and a thirty-day response requirement was
added.113 Finally, the revised model confirms that each Party “may . . .
provide opportunities for public participation” regarding any matter
arising under the Environment Article. 114 These relatively weak
enforcement provisions, while stronger than those under the 2004


108 Mark Kantor, The New U.S. Model BIT: “If Both Sides Are Angry With You, You Must Be
Doing Something Right”, 9 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT 47, 47 (2012).
109 2004 MODEL BIT: TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF [COUNTRY] CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT 15 (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.p
df [hereinafter 2004 Model BIT].
110 2012 MODEL BIT: TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF [COUNTRY] CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT 17 (2012), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20f
or%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf [hereinafter 2012 MODEL BIT] (emphasis added).
111 Id.
112 2004 MODEL BIT, supra note 109.
113 2012 MODEL BIT, supra note 110, at 18.
114 Id.
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Model, disappointed environmental NGOs. 115 Many advocates had
hoped for environmental obligations that were enforceable by means of
binding dispute resolution, similar to the approach taken in recent U.S.
free trade agreements. 116 Meanwhile, industry groups questioned
whether this new expansion of environmental protections might be
“counterproductive.”117
B. Legalization of International Environmental Law via BITs
Without a binding enforcement mechanism, it is unclear how
changing “strive to ensure” to “shall ensure” will impact the legalization
effect on the enforcement of environmental laws. Similarly, the
implications of the explicit recognition of multilateral environmental
agreements in the text of the BIT have not been fully explored. One
possibility is that this change in language will increase the success of
either environmental counterclaims or necessity defenses brought by
states in investment arbitrations.118 The admissibility of counterclaims is
typically determined by “the scope of the jurisdictional and choice of
law clauses as well as the facts of the case.”119 Viñuales argues, “An
environmental counter-claim could be brought only if the applicable
treaty directs the arbitral tribunal to apply domestic (environmental)
law.”120 However, the text of the U.S. Model BIT also provides that “the
tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty
and applicable rules of international law.”121 Does the explicit mention
of the importance of multilateral environmental agreements within the
text of the BIT make them “applicable rules of international law” in the
event of an investment dispute that implicates the environment? The
acknowledgment of these multilateral agreements must signal to the
arbitrators that there is a potential conflict of norms of international
law—not just merely a discrepancy between the mandates of the BIT
and the defendant state’s environmental law.
To the extent that any of these results lead to the elevation of the
norms created under MEAs to the level of those obligations created


Kantor, supra note 108, at 47.
Sarah Anderson et al., The New U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Public Interest
Critique 2, 4–5 (May 9, 2012), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/BITResponseMay12.pdf.
117 Kantor, supra note 108, at 47 (citing the Emergency Committee for American Trade
(“ECAT”)).
118 For more on this topic, please see JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
119 Viñuales, supra note 79, at 10.
120 Id.
121 2012 MODEL BIT, supra note 110, at 33.
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under the BIT, the MEAs themselves benefit from an increase in
legitimacy and legalization.
C. Implications in Investment Arbitration for the Inclusion of MEAs:
Environmental Rights of Actions for Investors
It is possible that the increased recognition of the importance of both
international and domestic environmental law in the text of a BIT could
lead to successful environmental claims as direct investment claims.122
Viñuales presents such a case, where a host State’s non-enforcement of
its own environmental laws as well as international treaties has been
alleged to be a violation of the investment protections granted under a
BIT.123 Peter Allard v. Government of Barbados is a case currently in
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) arbitration under the Canada-Barbados BIT. In the
Notice of Dispute, the Canadian investor alleges that Barbados’ acts and
omissions violated the Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance, the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the
Marine Pollution Act of Barbados.124 These acts and omissions allegedly
resulted in Barbados breaching the Fair and Equitable Treatment and
Full Protection and Security guarantees of the BIT.125 In addition, the
complaint asserts that the environmental degradation that resulted from
Barbados’s acts and omissions led to a de facto expropriation of the
investment in the eco-tourism facility.126 The Canadian investor seeks
compensation in the amount of $34 million.127
This opportunity for environmental claims to be brought under BITs
in the form of investment claims has not been lost on the environmental
advocacy community in the United States. The Advisory Committee
Report submitted in 2009 to the Department of State contained
recommendations for the upcoming Model BIT rewrite. In it, the
Committee asked that the USTR confirm that “certain types of nonprofit
acquisitions abroad have the character of an ‘investment’” and that “the
Model BIT [should] accord BIT protections to such acquisitions.”128 The


See generally Viñuales, supra note 79.
Id. at 6.
124 Notice of Dispute, ¶¶ 10–13, Peter A. Allard v. Barbados (Sept. 8, 2009), available at
http://graemehall.com/legal/papers/BIT-Complaint.pdf.
125 Id. ¶ 21.
126 Id. ¶¶ 17–20.
127 Id. ¶¶ 10–13.
128 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
REGARDING THE MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 1 (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.usch
amber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/grc/BITReviewReportandAnnexFinalVersion.pdf.
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Committee sought explicit confirmation that an ecological preservation
would “enjoy BIT protections regardless of whether the acquirer had an
expectation of profit.”129 Under the definitions of the 2012 Model BIT,
“investment” is defined as “every asset that an investor owns or
controls, . . . that has the characteristics of an investment, including such
characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources. . . .
Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an enterprise . . .”130 An
“enterprise” is earlier defined as “any entity constituted or organized
under applicable law, whether or not for profit . . . including a . . .
trust.” 131 It appears that at least under the U.S. Model BIT,
environmentalists who establish forest preserves and nature sanctuaries
are permitted to bring a claim should their rights as investors be
violated.
D. Corporate Social Responsibility
An environmentally related provision that has been occurring with
more frequency in both investment treaties and trade agreements is one
that asks for countries to promote Corporate Social Responsibility
(“CSR”) in some way. The Chile-U.S. and the U.S.-Singapore FTAs
(2004) both contain articles within their Environment Chapters entitled
“Principles of Corporate Stewardship”:
Recognizing the substantial benefits brought by international
trade and investment as well as the opportunity for enterprises to
implement policies for sustainable development that seek to
ensure coherence between social, economic and environmental
objectives, each Party should encourage enterprises operating
within its territory or jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate
sound principles of corporate stewardship in their internal
policies, such as those principles or agreements that have been
endorsed by both Parties.132

Similarly, the Canada-Benin BIT, signed in 2013, provides that each
Party “should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or
subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally
recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in their practices


2012 MODEL BIT, supra note 110, at 2.
Id. at 3.
131 Id. at 2.
132 U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 22, art. 19.10; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, surpa note 22, art. 18.9.
129
130
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and internal policies.”133 The Investment Chapter of the Canada-Peru
FTA contains identical language; its preamble replicates it again.134
Norway’s 2007 Model BIT (later shelved) went a step further and
required the Parties to “agree to encourage investors to conduct their
investment activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and to participate in the United Nations
Global Compact.” 135 Hepburn and Kuuya point out that a comment
released along with the Model BIT makes it clear that this CSR
provision is meant to change the behavior of countries that have not
already committed to the OECD guidelines.136
What legal weight do these Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”)
provisions really carry? The BITs and FTAs themselves are treaties that
create legally binding obligations upon their State parties. CSR
generally applies to corporate entities, not states, and its mandates are
typically voluntary. At most, states are obligated to “encourage” the
adoption of legally non-binding standards.
However, a legalization analysis shows that these may not be
completely empty provisions. In terms of obligation, its legal
characteristics are low. However, in terms of precision, the OECD
Guidelines can themselves be quite specific. Corporations are
encouraged to maintain an environmental management system that
includes monitoring impacts, adopting efficient technologies, and
providing environmental education to employees and customers.137 It is
also evident that Norway was attempting to use its BIT as a tool to get
its treaty partners to agree to soft law principles that they would not
have otherwise accepted. As Abbot et al. note, “[o]ver time, even
nonbinding declarations can shape the practices of states and other
actors and their expectations of appropriate conduct, leading to the


133 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of
Benin for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-Benin, art. 16, Jan. 6,
2013, 2014 Can. T.S. No. 13, available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/m
aecd-dfatd/FR4-2014-13.pdf.
134 Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Peru, art. 810, May 29, 2008, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/perutoc-perou-tdm.aspx?lang=eng.
135 KINGDOM OF NORWAY, DRAFT VERSION: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF
NORWAY AND [ ] FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS (2007) art. 32,
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1031.pdf (emphasis added).
136 Jarrod Hepburn & Vuyelwa Kuuya, Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment
Treaties, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 602–05 (2011) (citing
Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements, § 4.6.3, INVESTMENT TREATY ARB.,
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NorwayModel2007-commentary.doc.).
137 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 43–44 (2011), available at www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines.
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emergence of customary law or the adoption of harder agreements. Soft
commitments may also implicate the legal principle of good faith
compliance, weakening objections to subsequent developments.”138 The
inclusion of CSR provisions in BITs and FTAs are an example of the
“blurring” that can occur between “hard” and “soft” law. These
provisions have at the very least moved CSR principles farther along the
“continuum” from soft to hard law.
V. WHY THESE PROVISIONS IN THESE TREATIES? A LOOK AT
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PROCESS
The previous sections of this paper were devoted to an exploration of
how international environmental law, its players, and its enforcement,
has been changed by the evolution of free trade agreements and bilateral
investment treaties. This next section seeks to answer the questions:
‘Why these provisions?’ and ‘Why these treaties?’ Why is detailed and
aggressive protection for forests mandated, instead of clean water—or
climate regulation? How do these provisions find themselves in trade
and investment agreements at all? Why are these issues not simply dealt
with in multilateral environmental agreements?
This section looks more closely at the policy and politics behind
these agreements, with a focus on FTAs and the “fast track” legislative
authorization they require. Applying theories of international
negotiation, most significantly Putnam’s “two-level game,” this section
identifies the factors that account for the trade and environment linkage
outcomes outlined in the preceding sections. These factors include:
trade-offs resulting from linkage of international issues; coalitions
formed among domestic groups, as well as transnational coalitions
formed between allied groups from different states at the negotiation
table; whether the negotiation was bilateral or multilateral; and the
relative size of the domestic “win-sets.” Reference to Putnam’s
framework can be used to explain why enforcement provisions
governing the seven Multilateral Environmental Agreements were
included in the U.S.-Peru Trade Agreement and why MEA enforcement
in the upcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership is one of the largest
remaining areas of unresolved conflict in the negotiation. The next
section provides a brief history of domestic politics with regard to the
U.S. trade agenda.
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A. Background on Process
In order to understand the role that Congress plays in international
trade negotiations, it is necessary to look at the development of Trade
Promotion Authority (or Fast Track) legislation. While the executive
branch has constitutional power to negotiate international trade
agreements, Congress must ratify these agreements if statutory
implementation is required to bear them out.139 Starting in 1934, the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act delegated authority to the president
to negotiate tariff reduction with other nations.140 This authority was
expanded under the Trade Act of 1974 to cover “non-tariff trade
barriers,” though consultation requirements between Congress and the
President were added.141 The 1974 Act was also the first instance of the
“fast track” process, whereby Congress agreed to consider the
implementing legislation required under trade agreements in an
expedited fashion.142 Through this bargain, Congress bound itself to an
up-or-down vote on the required legislation (with no amendments
considered) in exchange for being consulted throughout the negotiation
process. 143 Fast track authorization continued with uninterrupted
renewals until 1993.144
1. 1990s: The Fight Over Trade Promotion Authority
In the early 1990s, domestic constituent concern about the negative
effects of trade liberalization made the renewal of fast track authority
more controversial. Labor and environmental groups, and the House
Democrats they supported, were its strongest opponents. In 1991, a
renewal of fast track authority was sought by President Bush in
anticipation of the negotiation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”). Labor coalitions were firmly opposed to a free
trade agreement with Mexico and lobbied hard against the renewal of
fast track authority. 145 Environmental groups “were split on fast
track”—with some giving conditional support if the agreement included


139 See CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21004, TRADE PROMOTION
AUTHORITY AND FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS: MAJOR
VOTES (2011).
140 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 73–316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). For more
information see SMITH, supra note 139, at 1.
141 SMITH, supra note 139, at 1.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA)
AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 6 (2014).
145 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195.
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environmental protection.146 The 1991 renewal eventually passed after a
long battle by the Bush Administration, with the House vote divided by
party lines (two-thirds of all Democrats voted to oppose it).147
The main agreement of the NAFTA text had already been signed
(though not ratified), when Bill Clinton defeated George Bush in the
1992 presidential election. Rather than re-opening the text to
negotiation, the Clinton Administration, in deference to the priorities of
its party, began negotiating side agreements on labor and environment
with Mexico and Canada.148 The two side agreements that resulted could
reportedly be tolerated by House Republicans because “neither of them
really had [enforcement] sanctions involved.” 149 While some
environmental groups remained loyal to the NAFTA side-agreement
compromise, certain Democratic Congressmen that had voted to renew
fast track in 1991 opted against NAFTA in the final vote.150 Partly out of
disappointment with the substance of the NAFTA environmental
agreements, House Democrats were reinvigorated to condition future
fast track authority on more substantive requirements for environment
and labor.151
Following the acceptance of NAFTA, it was the Republican Party’s
turn to oppose fast track renewal. The Clinton administration put
forward a fast-track draft that required labor and environmental
obligations to be included in future trade agreements. These
requirements were to be enforced by trade sanctions. 152 Citing
opposition from their constituents in the business community, House
Republicans rejected the draft. Fast track was defeated in 1994 and
again in 1995 by the Republican-controlled House.153
Joining Republican opposition to fast track in this period were
traditionally Democratic constituents. Labor unions organized in force


Id. at 195.
Id. at 196–97.
148 Id. at 198.
149 Id. at 198 (citing Interview by Cheran Devereaux with Brian Biernon, Legislative Assistant
to Representative David Dreier (Mar. 1998)).
150 Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Gephardt Declares Against NAFTA Democrat Cites Threat to U.S.
Jobs, BALT. SUN, Sept. 22, 1993, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-09-22/news/1993265014
_1_gephardt-nafta-treaty.
151 “The side agreements were unacceptable to Mr. Gephardt, which is why he opposed the
final passage of NAFTA. So having that history under our belt, we then wanted to make sure that
the fast-track language in 1994 and thereafter was much more specific about what constituted an
acceptable conclusion.” Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 200 (citing Interview by Cheran
Devereaux with Mike Wessel, Trade Advisor to Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (Mar. 1998)).
152 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 198.
153 Id. at 202–204.
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against a 1997 fast-track effort, claiming that job loss was directly
attributable to the enactment of NAFTA. 154 In addition, several
environmental organizations that had supported NAFTA in 1993 now
switched sides to oppose fast track legislation. Steven Shimberg of the
National Wildlife Federation gave testimony to the House
Subcommittee on Trade to that effect:
We recognized the potential of trade as an instrument to
enhance environmental protection, and believed that NAFTA
was a good first step toward the integration of trade and
environment. . . . Based on our experience with NAFTA and
with other trade and investment agreements, we now know we
can no longer rely solely on side agreements to achieve our
environmental objectives, or on fast track rules which do not
state explicit goals for environmental protection.155

The major push in 1997 on the part of the Clinton administration and
lobbyists from business to renew fast track failed yet again. House
Democrats refused to support a bill that did not “use the power of trade
sanctions to keep developing nations from lowering labor and
environmental standards to win in the global marketplace.”156
In 2001, with a Republican president in the White House, new fast
track legislation was once again proposed, though this time repackaged
with the new name of ‘Trade Promotion Authority.’ While the bill did
include labor and environmental standards in its outline of negotiating
goals for U.S. trade agreements, these goals were not required for a
negotiated agreement to receive ultimate approval from Congress.157 In
July of 2002 the “Bipartisan” Trade Promotion Authority was finally
passed, with eighty-eight percent of Republicans supporting the
measure as compared with twelve percent of Democrats.158
Under this 2002 Authority, the Bush Administration entered into
trade agreements with Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain,
as well as a group of Central American countries under DR-CAFTA.159


Id. at 207.
Implementation of Fast Track Authority: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 229 (1997) (testimony of
Steven J. Shimberg, vice president for Fed. and Int’l Affairs, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).
156 Alison Mitchell, Clinton Retreats on Trade Power; Prospects Slight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/11/world/the-trade-bill-the-overview-clinton-retreats-ontrade-power-prospects-slight.html.
157 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 229–30.
158 Id. at 231.
159 Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
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Continued opposition from the Democratic Party meant that these
agreements relied on the Republic majority to pass the yes-no
ratification vote. The Administration was in the process of negotiating
four further trade agreements—with South Korea, Panama, Colombia
and Peru—when Democrats took control of Congress in January of
2007. 160 There was little hope of these agreements receiving
Congressional approval—even just via a down-up vote—without
concessions for labor and environment.
2. May 10 Agreement
U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and President Bush entered
into lengthy negotiations with the House Democrats, represented by
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer.
These negotiations centered on the desired labor and environment
objectives.161 The Democrats made it clear that the additional provisions
had to be incorporated into the main text of the negotiated treaties, not
added in a side agreement as they had been with NAFTA when
President Clinton gained control in 1993.162 During this time, House
Ways and Means Committee Chair Charles Rangel announced that there
was “‘no question’ that a deal must include a provision that would
obligate countries to uphold their obligations under multilateral
environmental agreements.”163
The resulting May 10 “Bipartisan Trade Deal” functioned as the
blueprint for the U.S.-Peru TPA discussed at length in Sections II and
III above. The Agreement was hailed as both a “victory for Democrats”
and a “shrewd compromise by the White House.” 164 The Bush
Administration hoped that this agreement would mean that Democrats,
largely anti-trade since the days of NAFTA, could be counted on to
support trade deals in the future. Officials from both parties expressed
hope that the May 10 Agreement could be “a template for all trade


160 Fact Sheet Latin American and Korean Free Trade Agreements Vital to U.S. Economy and
Security, EMBASSY U.S. SEOUL KOR. (Oct. 12, 2007), http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_413_1012fs.
html.
161 Administration, Congress Continue High-Level Effort on FTAs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar.
9, 2007.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Steven Weisman, Bush and Democrats in Accord on Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/business/11trade.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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deals” beyond the four at issue.165 Pelosi announced, “where it comes
down to labor standards and environment, this is enormous progress.”166
B. Negotiation Theory and Environmental Priorities of Trade
Agreements
Free trade Republicans and the business interests they represented
fought a long battle against their pro-labor and environment Democratic
counterparts. Clearly, simple electoral politics is one of the biggest
reasons for the existence of the May 10 Agreement and the U.S.-Peru
FTA provisions that it shaped. Public opinion had selected more tradeskeptical leaders to define the negotiating objectives of the U.S.
government in Congress. To understand some of the other factors that
played a role in this ideological battle, this paper now turns to
negotiation theory.
1. Theory of Two-Level Games
A better understanding of just how the environmental provisions of
these trade and investment agreements are determined can be gained by
borrowing the now famous conceptual framework of Robert Putnam. In
1988, Putnam proposed that the interaction of international diplomacy
and domestic politics can be described as a two-level game: “At the
national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level,
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of
foreign developments.”167 In Putnam’s terminology, the “Level I” game
occurs between the lead negotiators in the international arena. This
could be the United States Trade Representative and his Peruvian
counterpart, if we take the U.S.-Peru TPA as our example. The “Level
II” game occurs when these leaders bring the negotiated agreement back
home and there is a separate discussion among the various domestic
constituents about whether or not to endorse the agreement.168


Id.
Id.
167 Putnam, supra note 98, at 434.
168 While Putnam’s article concerned international agreements generally, not just those
dealing with trade, his quote from Robert Strauss illustrates this point well: “During my tenure as
Special Trade Representative, I spent as much time negotiating with domestic constituents (both
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These games do not necessarily occur in sequence. The estimated
Level II preferences are ever-present in the minds of the Level I
negotiators, knowing that they cannot reach an agreement among
themselves that will fail to be ratified when brought home. In the U.S.
system, the basic Level II game occurs when Congress must vote on
whether or not to ratify a treaty. However, there are many domestic
determinants of foreign policy, and each member of Congress is
influenced by a wide range of constituents. Interest group lobbying,
upcoming elections, and political party preferences are all
considerations in the overall Level II game.
In international negotiation, the Level I players deliver a negotiated
agreement to their home legislatures that must be accepted as a whole,
or rejected entirely. Any desired amendment at Level II, however
minor, sends the entire agreement back to the Level I drawing board for
re-negotiation. With U.S. trade agreements this process is formalized by
the passage of “Fast Track” authority, more recently called Trade
Promotion Authority. Under this legislation, USTR is given the
authority to negotiate a trade agreement that, so long as it meets certain
minimal requirements outlined by Congress, will be subject to a simple
up-or-down vote for ratification. In this framework, Putnam calls all the
possible Level I agreements that could receive ratification at Level II a
“win-set.”169
2. Why MEAs?
A key question that arises when considering the May 10 Agreement
is: Why did the House Democrats define their environmental agenda
with reference to pre-existing multilateral environmental agreements?
An alternative could have been to draft minimum environmental
standards that became obligatory on the FTA partner. There are several
possible explanations for the use of MEAs in this fashion.
Firstly, reference to an already-negotiated agreement makes the Level
I negotiation more manageable. A “take it or leave it” approach to the
minimum environmental requirements means that Level I negotiators do
not expend resources negotiating environmental details in addition to
the topics traditionally covered by trade agreements, including tariff
reductions and stances on intellectual property rights. If the parties


TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: A CASE STUDY IN BUILDING
DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMACY vii (1987)).
169 Putnam, supra note 98, at 437.
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undertook to negotiate substantive binding environmental provisions
from scratch, the negotiation process might never conclude.
The second explanation emerges from Putnam’s theory that “the
relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the
distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain.”170 This
means that the wider the perceived range of agreements that will be
accepted at the Level II game, the more the Level I negotiator can be
forced to compromise to reach agreement. As a result, it is
advantageous for the United States to demonstrate to its potential treaty
partners that Congress will not budge on certain issues—including the
environment. The May 10 Bipartisan Agreement, which listed the
original seven MEAs in 2007, was such a signal. The Agreement was
not only a negotiation directive to USTR, it was also a public document
meant to be read by Peruvian negotiators so they knew not to fight hard
against the enforcement of the MEAs. There is a bargaining advantage
to having a document that lists the environmental hard lines of the
United States. Reference to the MEAs facilitated this signaling.
A third reason for integration of the MEAs is legitimacy. A former
USTR official stated in an interview that MEAs were used because
Congress was looking for international agreements that had the same
kind of consensus as the ILO Principles: “We needed this to know what
the right kind of international environmental obligations would be.”171
The United States appears as less of an aggressor to the sovereignty of
its developing country trading partner if it asks for that country to
enforce obligations already willingly agreed to in previous treaties.
Inter-Level II negotiation is a fourth explanation. The Democratic
Party knows that its voting base cares about the environment, though
neither the Congressmen nor most of the constituents that vote for them
are experts on the environment. Voters look to groups like the Sierra
Club to tell them which issues are important and educate them on which
politicians are “pro-environment.” Especially in the context of trade
agreements, where the large number of issues can pull in multiple
directions, the “asks” of interest groups must remain simple and easy to
communicate. Reference to an environmental treaty is a simple way to
package a long list of obligations.
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3. Why Trade Agreements?
A repeated opposition to the inclusion of labor and environmental
provisions in free trade agreements is that they do not belong there,
which is sometimes articulated as, ‘leave tariff reductions to trade
agreements and negotiate environment laws in environmental treaties.’
The chief of staff for a Republican Congressmen in the era of the 1994
fast track vote said as much:
We have contended all along that there is no reason to have
[labor and environmental provisions] in fast-track legislation,
because the administration already has the authority to negotiate
labor and environmental agreements. . . .We can do the same
thing as in NAFTA where those issues were handled outside the
scope of the actual treaty.172

a. Issue Linkage
In his influential article, Putnam wrote that understanding “issue
linkage[s] is absolutely crucial to understanding how domestic and
international politics can become entangled.” 173 Issue linkage is
fundamental to the success of modern trade agreements, and was crucial
in the long debate over the passage of Trade Promotion Authority. An
example is useful in understanding how linkages work: suppose some
majority of Level II players are opposed to a certain policy (say
liberalized trade, because of fears of job loss). However, some number
of these players could be convinced to change their stance in exchange
for progress on another issue that they care about (increased global
environmental regulation, for example). This trade-off could never
occur at the Level II bargaining table alone, because while the U.S.
government can lower its own tariff barriers, it cannot unilaterally
regulate pollution in Mexico.
The explanation, from a negotiation perspective, for why interest
groups fight to have environmental provisions in trade agreements
comes from the political realities in both the Level I and Level II games.
At Level II, interest groups know that their issues are far more likely to
get approval if they are tied as a package with an issue the majority
strongly supports. The environmental community knew that House
Republicans would not vote “no” on the set of four upcoming FTAs that
included Peru. Their successful passage was too important to their


172 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 200 (citing an Interview by Charan Devereaux with Don
Carlson, Chief of Staff for Representative Bill Archer (Mar. 1994)).
173 Putnam, supra note 98, at 446–47.
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business constituents to be derailed by the inclusion of unwanted
environmental provisions. Environmental NGOs know that they are
much more likely to get environmental provisions in an FTA passed
than a freestanding international agreement on the environment. “Look
at the track record with regard to Congressional approval of treaties,” a
USTR official said. “Congress is much more likely to sign on to a trade
agreement than a multilateral environmental treaty.”174
Issue linkage also plays a crucial role at the Level I game. The
legalization of environmental provisions in international economic
treaties was discussed at length above. There, it was observed that
though Peru had already signed on to CITES, it had failed to pass
measures to enforce its requirements. Peru eventually signed on to the
“stick” of binding and enforceable forestry measures because it was also
promised the “carrot” of liberalized trade with the United States.
Devereaux et al. observed a similar linkage occurring around the union
lobby for labor provisions in fast track. While Republicans argued that
“labor talks belong at institutions like the International Labor
Organization . . . [u]nions disagreed, noting that workers have no
leverage at the ILO because the organization lacks the power to enforce
its conventions.” 175 “We want the same kind of binding dispute
resolution for our concerns that business gets for things like intellectual
property rights and investment rules,” said union policy analyst Thea
Lee. “Businesses understand, as we do, that you use the leverage of a
trade agreement to obtain promises from your lending partners to
improve their laws.”176
Issue linkages can occur because a coalition of Level II constituents
hold the ratification of the agreement hostage while demanding
concession on their individual special interest. Of course, this
phenomenon can also occur in votes on solely domestic legislation.
However, it is more likely to occur in the international trade context.
“People are looking for tools,” said a USTR negotiator in an interview,
“[We are in the process of negotiating a] BIT with China, and it’s the
only treaty being debated with China at the moment, so a lot of people
want to pack a lot into it.”177 People want every issue they have with
China solved through this one BIT because it is the only treaty on the
table.
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b. Bilateral Bargaining
The bilateral nature of the FTAs in question is a further reason why
environmental special interest groups seek action through FTAs rather
than MEAs. Salacuse provides two explanations for why the number of
bilateral investment treaties has steadily risen even while attempts to
form a global Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) have
repeatedly failed.178 Firstly, a negotiation of an agreement between two
parties is far less complicated than a negotiation between multiple
parties.179 The technical difficulties of accommodating all party interests
have stalled the creation of an MAI. Secondly, the political realist
explanation for the ‘success’ of bilateral agreements is that these FTAs
are typically negotiated between a wealthy and powerful country and a
weaker country still in the process of development. 180 This power
asymmetry results in the developed nation coercively achieving most of
its objectives.181 The developing country sees itself as having more to
gain from an FTA relative to its partner, and thus more to lose if the
negotiation fails.182
In a multilateral negotiation, however, the weaker nations are able to
ally themselves into coalitions to block the objectives of the powerful
nation(s). 183 Therefore, it is easier for the Level I negotiator to get
concessions from Peru when he is negotiating with just Peru. In a
multilateral setting, Peru could ally itself with other countries and form
an oppositional coalition to resist binding environmental commitments,
or perhaps suggest environmental issues that the U.S. does not want to
consider (like action on climate). Indeed, such a situation is occurring in
the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, discussed below.
c. BITSs v. FTAs as Vehicles for Environmental Linkage
Now we turn to the question of why, from a negotiation and process
perspective, there has been more progress on environmental provisions
in free trade agreements than bilateral investment treaties. One key
factor is that the United States already has an open and secure


178 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J.
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182 L. F. Perez Hurtado, Dealing with Power Imbalance in International Trade Agreement
Negotiation: The Mexican Case in NAFTA 47 (2001) (unpublished L.L.M. Paper, Harvard Law
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183 Salacuse, supra note 178, at 464.

2015]

Integration of Environmental Law

139

investment climate for foreign investors, and so it has less to offer in a
BIT negotiation than it does in an FTA. The U.S. has less bargaining
power to make its negotiating partners accept unpopular environmental
provisions in BIT negotiations. Another factor is that the Level II
ratification process is different for BITs than for FTAs, meaning
different considerations for players who must weigh domestic politics in
the negotiation process. BITs, as international treaties, must receive
approval from two-thirds of the Senate, rather than a majority of both
the Senate and the House, as is required for the implementing legislation
of TPAs.184 For this reason, the president does not need to seek Trade
Promotion Authority before he enters into negotiations with another
country.185 This means that in pursuing a completion of a BIT, 1) there
are a smaller number of politicians for special interest groups to
persuade and 2) the time window for coalition forming and Level II
negotiation is smaller.
4. Coalitions
a. Level II Coalitions
In Putnam’s universe, the key to winning the Level II game is by
forming a coalition among domestic constituents that together have the
strength to refuse to accept any Level I agreement that does not meet the
objectives of the group. This theory explains well the story of the
evolution of environmental objectives in free trade agreements. The fast
track vote preceding NAFTA in 1991 and the vote on NAFTA itself,
“split” the environmentalists. 186 The Sierra Club and Friends of the
Earth opposed it. 187 Greenpeace wrote that “even by modest
expectations . . . [the side agreements] would have to be judged a
complete failure.” 188 On the other side, the Environmental Defense


184 SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2013).
185 MEREDITH BROADBENT & ROBBINS PANCAKE, REINVIGORATING THE U.S. BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY PROGRAM: A TOOL TO PROMOTE TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
10 (2012), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/120629_Broadbent_ReinvigoratingBIT_W
eb.pdf.
186 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195.
187 Gary Lee, ‘Fast Track’ Sprint: Frenzied Lobbying on a Treaty Not Yet Written, WASH.
POST, May 23, 1991, at A21; Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195–196.
188 William P. Avery, Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 281 (1998)
(citing GREENPEACE, NAFTA: TRADING AWAY TOMORROW, GREENPEACE 4 (1993)).
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Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Nature
Conservancy decided to support NAFTA.189
The Bush Administration fostered this fractioning in order to avoid a
strong Level II coalition that would push for more binding
environmental commitments. “NAFTA was a hard process,” said one
veteran of that time. “The Environmental Groups were set against one
another during the negotiations of the NAFTA side agreements. Eight or
nine were allowed to give input on the negotiations in exchange for not
opposing the final outcome. This ostracized the Sierra Club and Public
Citizen.”190 Level II coalitions had to make a choice on whether or not
to engage with the policy makers and try to shape the trade agenda in a
pro-environment way, or to oppose the measure altogether. When
leaders from the Nature Conservancy and other groups met with
President Bush to discuss NAFTA objectives, Ralph Nader issued a
public letter accusing them of “selling out.”191 All of the labor groups
and some of the environmental groups stood strong in their opposition
to NAFTA, while certain others thought that the side agreements had
made enough progress to play along. The leader of the National Wildlife
Federation (“NWF”), Jay Hair, wrote an op-ed supporting NAFTA in
the Washington Post that called the 1991 fast track compromise
“considerable progress.”192
The environmental groups that remained firm in their opposition
knew that their position was doomed once their coalition had been
broken. “‘At the very least,’ said a spokesperson for the Friends of the
Earth, ‘we expected the big environmental groups to stay on the fence.
Hair’s endorsement was strong enough to hurt our position.’”193 Hair, of
the NWF, later declared that environmental opponents of NAFTA “put
their narrow political agenda ahead of the broad public interests.”194
Many of the environmental groups would come to regret siding with
the pro-NAFTA coalition. Ironically, NWF was one of the most vocal
opponents to future fast track authorization. In 1997, a representative
testified that, “we can no longer rely . . . on fast track rules which do not


189 Six Environmental Organizations Back NAFTA, Denounce Opponents, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
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191 Lee, supra note 187; Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195–196.
192 Jay D. Hair, An Environmental Vote, WASH. POST, May 22, 1991, A20.
193 Fredrick W. Mayer, Negotiating NAFTA: Political Lessons for the FTAA, in GREENING
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state explicit goals for environmental protection.” 195 Environmental
groups made this opposition clear to the Democrats in the House
throughout the period between NAFTA and the 2007 Bipartisan
Agreement. In July 2006, DR-CAFTA had passed the House by just two
votes, with 187 out of 202 Democrats voting “no.”196 The eventual May
10 victory was a result of the Democratic/Labor/Environment coalition
holding strong to the binding provisions that they had been seeking
since 1991. In the words of one Hill staffer, “All in all, there is not one
issue in which the Democrats caved to the White House. This was one
of the best showings of spine by Democrats in Congress” in four
years.197
b. Transnational Coalitions
Putnam also introduced the concept of “transnational coalitions,”
whereby a “Level I negotiator may find silent allies at his opponent’s
domestic table. . . . Thus transnational alignments may emerge, tacit or
explicit, in which domestic interests pressure their respective
governments to adopt mutually supportive policies.” 198 These crossborder coalitions developed throughout the negotiations of FTAs. One
year before the final U.S.-Peru TPA was concluded, the Natural
Resources Defense Council teamed up with two NGOs from Peru to sue
the U.S. Government in the U.S. Court of Trade.199 The suit alleged that
the U.S. government facilitated the violation of CITES by allowing
inspectors to look the other way when illegal wood imports entered the
United States.200 The case was dismissed but the groups continued to
lobby for forestry regulation in the U.S.-Peru TPA. 201 The antienvironment coalition had similar allegiances. One House Republican


195 The Implementation of Fast Track Trade Negotiating Authority: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 229 (1997) (statement of
Steven J. Shimberg, Vice President for Federal and International Affairs, National Wildlife
Federation).
196 I. M. (Mac) Destler, American Trade Politics in 2007: Building Bipartisan Compromise,
PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.: POL’Y BRIEF, May 2007, at 4, http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/
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197 Defeating the Bush Trade Agenda, DAILY KOS (May 12, 2007), http://www.dailykos.com/
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198 Putnam, supra note 98, at 444.
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recalled, “what we heard from the Canadians and the Mexicans was that
the [Clinton] administration was attempting to portray Congress as
demanding side agreements that were enforceable by sanctions. For
much of that year, Republican members actually consulted more closely
with the Mexicans and Canadians than they did with the Clinton
administration. The staff members were having meetings saying ‘Don’t
believe [the administration].’”202
5. Why these MEAs?
One particular, and unusual, Level II coalition played a major role in
the 2007 Amendments to the already negotiated U.S.-Peru TPA: the
allegiance between the U.S. timber lobby and environment groups.
Crucially, these groups were already united and motivated around the
passage of a separate law, the 2008 amendment to the Lacey Act, which
unanimously passed the House Committee on Natural Resources in
October of 2007.203 The strangeness of the bedfellows behind this law is
well demonstrated by an introduction to an NRDC article on the issue:
“Name an environmental law strongly supported by both Republicans
and Democrats, America’s timber industry, purchasers of wood
products, labor unions, and environmental organizations. Stumped?”204
The Lacey Act was first passed in 1900 to combat illegal poaching of
game. The 2008 Amendment expanded its scope to cover illegal logging
in the global timber industry. The existence of this “ready-made
coalition” is a partial explanation for not only why CITES was included
on the list of seven required MEAs in the May 10 Agreement, but also
why such a disproportionate effort was spent on its enforcement in the
U.S.-Peru TPA.205 One tenth of the text of the May 10 agreement is
spent detailing the mandate to “USTR to conclude an Annex to the FTA
covering forest sector governance and operations in Peru.”206
As one insider to the process noted, figuring out how certain
provisions make it into a trade agreement over others often involves


202 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 198 (citing Interview by Charan Devereaux with David
Dreier (Mar. 1998)).
203 Press Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Combat Illegal Logging Legislation Passes Senate (Dec.
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asking which provisions were opposed the least, rather than championed
the most. 207 Leading up to the May 10 Agreement, environmental
groups had been fighting for the inclusion of all MEAs, not just the
seven that eventually made it on to the list.208 According to House
Democrat Lloyd Doggett, a March 2007 proposed TPA agreement had
included no such limitation to the covered agreements.209
VI. LOOKING AHEAD: ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN MEGA-TREATIES
The inclusion of international environmental obligations within the
text of international trade and investment agreements has received
increased popular attention with the rise of U.S. participation in “mega
treaties.” The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) is a trade agreement
currently under negotiation between the United States, Canada, and ten
other countries around the Pacific Rim.210 The negotiation of the TPP
has gone through twenty-one rounds since it was kicked off in 2010.211
The 2013 deadline for completion was missed, though the Ministers and
Heads of Delegation for the parties issued a statement in February 2014
that all were “committed to concluding as soon as possible.”212 The
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”) is a proposed
free trade agreement between the European Union and the United
States. Negotiations for the agreement began in July 2013 and both
parties have indicated that a final agreement could come as early as
2015.213 There has been controversy over the environmental impact of
both agreements, particularly the TPP.
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A. Trans-Pacific Partnership
The current parties to the TPP are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United
States, and Vietnam.214 Numerous news agencies have reported that the
United States has faced significant opposition from its partners in the
negotiation of the Environment Chapter.215 The U.S. demand that the
obligations in the environment chapter be subject to the same dispute
settlement provisions as commercial violations has met with particular
resistance.216 There are four challenges to reaching agreement on an
aggressive environmental chapter: 1) the U.S. is seeking the most
expansive environmental commitments sought in any free trade
agreement to date; 2) some parties to the TPP are seeking commitments
on climate, a particularly challenging issue in domestic U.S. politics; 3)
Trade Promotion Authority expired at the end of 2007 and has yet to be
renewed; and 4) the TPP is a multilateral rather than bilateral arena.
1. Expansion of Environmental Objectives
USTR has indicated that it considers the May 10 Agreement to be its
“marching orders” on environment, despite the fact that the Trade
Promotion Authority it was written to amend expired at the end of
2007. 217 A January 2014 Wikileaks release of the draft text of the
Environment Chapter indicates that this is mostly true. The U.S.
proposal includes commitments to the list of seven original MEAs,
though whether or not all of those commitments would be binding is
unclear—and controversial. 218 The United States is calling for
obligations to “adopt, maintain, and implement measures to fulfill
specific MEAs . . . enforceable through the DS [dispute settlement].”219
The leaked proposal includes obligations related to conservation of
plants and wildlife that are similar to those required under the U.S.-Peru
TPA. Most interesting is that, in addition to the measures seen in the
Peru FTA, the U.S. proposal in the environment chapter lists desired
obligations regarding “curbing . . . fisheries subsidies” and


214 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov
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“preventing[ing] overfishing and overcapacity.”220 These environmental
provisions go beyond the original measures of the May 10 Agreement.
On February 20, 2014 a coalition of 122 Democrats from the House
of Representatives sent a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Michael
Froman reiterating their position that the TPP must include strong
environmental measures.221 The letter was drafted in reaction to the
leaked text of the Environment Chapter and concerns that U.S.
negotiators had backed down on their goal to have all seven MEAs
enforced by binding dispute resolution. “These commitments must be
strong, binding and enforceable, and subject to the same dispute
settlement procedures as the commercial chapters, including recourse to
trade sanctions,” the letter stated.222 The letter also noted that because
the current parties to the TPP make up more than one-third of the global
fisheries catch, the Partnership “offers the opportunity to put in place a
rules-based, sustainable fishery management system.” The suggestion
that the trade agreement should be the tool for shaping a new global
fisheries law goes significantly beyond the territory of the May 10
Agreement by creating international environmental obligations without
reference to an already negotiated MEA.
2. Climate
The Wikileaks text was followed in February 2014 by a second leak,
which purported to summarize the U.S. counter proposal to the draft
text made public the month before.223 One of the most striking edits was
on the subject of climate change. The U.S. proposed to rename an entire
chapter from “Trade and Climate Change” to “Transition to a Low
Carbon Economy.” Text that originally read: “The parties . . . recognize
the importance of implementation of their respective commitments
under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)
and related legal instruments,” was rewritten in the U.S. version as:
“The Parties affirm the importance of moving towards low-emissions
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economies, and recognize the desirability of mutually supportive trade
and emissions-reduction policies in this regard.”224
It seems that TPP members have adopted the U.S. strategy of
referencing commitments to multilateral environmental treaties in the
text of trade agreements. In a reversal of roles, the U.S. balked at the
inclusion of the UNFCCC. The USTR released a statement in response
to the leak:
As part of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, the United
States is fully committed and actively working with our partners
to negotiate an ambitious agreement in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The environment
chapter of the TPP presents an opportunity to focus on making
progress on key, regional conservation issues and issues where
the nexus with trade is clear, such as in our proposals for the
first-ever disciplines on fisheries subsidies, and commitments to
combat wildlife trafficking and illegal logging.225

The decade-old argument that had been repeatedly used to counter fast
track authority—that certain (environmental) subjects do not belong in
trade agreements—was now used by the Obama Administration to fight
climate language in the TPP.
3. TPA Remains Expired
USTR negotiators at the Level 1 game may simply be “looking over
their shoulder” at the Level II ratification challenge when they seek to
avoid climate language. Climate change regulation remains an
extremely controversial topic in domestic U.S. politics. The inclusion of
climate commitments may be enough to rally opposition even among
those Congressmen who would otherwise like to see the successful
completion of the TPP. The fate of the Level II game for the TPP is both
crucial and uncertain. To date, Trade Promotion Authority remains
expired.226 While President Obama mentioned hopes for TPA in his
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State of the Union speech in January, however its fate remains
uncertain.227
4. Multilateral Arena
TPP success at the Level I game is more uncertain than previous
trade agreements because it is the first one in a truly multilateral arena.
The dynamics described by Salacuse to explain the prevalence of
bilateral agreements over multilateral agreements are now working in
reverse. The negotiation is more complicated because there are more
players with more issues. More relevant is the fact that weaker nations
can join together in their opposition rather than face off against the U.S.
alone. The leaked consolidated text of the TPP Environmental Chapter
indicates that ten countries—every TPP member except Malaysia—
currently oppose the U.S. in its desire to enforce certain MEAs via
binding dispute settlement.228
B. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”)
presents a further unpredictable negotiation dynamic with regard to
environmental issues. In this agreement, unlike the TPP, the United
States is not facing off against a coalition of smaller developing
countries, most of whom have weak environmental regulation. Instead,
the U.S. is negotiating bilaterally with another powerful state—a
powerful state with arguably more stringent domestic environmental
regulation. A position paper summarizing the E.U. proposals for the TTIP “Trade and Sustainable Development” Chapter (the E.U. typically
combines labor and environmental provisions into one chapter), was
leaked in July 2013.229 The position paper listed a number of MEAs it
wishes to include in T-TIP, four of which the U.S. is not a signatory to,
and noted that they were “of particular importance in trade
negotiations.”230


227 Siri Srinivas, Democrats Oppose Obama’s Demand for Fast-Tracking Pacific Trade Deal,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/21/democrats-opposeobama-fast-track-trade-agreement; Davis, supra note 226.
228 ANALYSIS OF LEAKED ENVIRONMENT CHAPTER, supra note 218.
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Despite their “importance,” the E.U. reportedly does not wish to see
binding dispute settlement provisions in the chapter(s) dealing with
labor and environment.231 Instead, the T-TIP should recognize “each
Party’s right to define and regulate its own domestic levels of
environmental and labor protection at the level deemed necessary.”232
Inside U.S. Trade called the paper “further evidence of the discrepancy
between the E.U.’s generally high aims and the degree to which any
deal will actually have teeth.”233
As discussed above in the section on the general E.U. approach to
FTAs, the E.U. has a practice of incorporating the Kyoto Protocol and
nonbinding commitments to counter climate change in the text of its
FTAs. We have seen from the leaked TPP negotiations that the current
U.S. Trade Representative wishes to avoid any mention of the word
“climate.” What will happen when two economically powerful nations
come to the negotiating table with different environmental agendas?
Will the United States agree to hortatory language regarding climate
change commitments, which would result in its most significant
international obligation to date in that arena—or will the E.U. agree to
scrap the mention of climate altogether?
C. Current Consensus on Trade/Investment Linkages and the
Environment: Has it Worked?
There are valid arguments on both sides of the debate around the
inclusion of binding environmental obligations in international
economic agreements. Some see the linkage of trade and environment
as a necessary counterweight to the harmful externalities of
globalization. Others balk at the idea of American Sierra Club members
telling Malaysians what they can and cannot harvest in their own
country. They would insist it would be better for Malaysians to write
environmental laws under their own sovereign power when they have
the income to afford it. This difference in opinion brings us back to the
introduction of the two competing theories of trade and environment
linkages: the Environmental Kuznets Curve and the pollution haven
hypothesis. 234 Before casting judgment on the legalization of
environmental norms through economic treaties, one might want to
know: Does it work? Is environmental degradation less than it would
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otherwise have been in those countries that signed on FTAs under the
May 10 template?
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently
conducted an assessment of the impact of the environmental provisions
of trade agreements in four partner countries: Chile, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Peru. 235 The GAO observed that, while significant
progress had been made in passing environmental laws and establishing
environmental institutions,236 more progress was needed to ensure these
laws were being adequately enforced:
Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru continue to face
environmental challenges, including limited technical capacity
and enforcement resources. Chile has taken significant steps to
meet its FTA obligations since 2009, while concerns remain
about Peru’s capacity to enforce protection of endangered
timber species and address emerging deforestation threats in the
Amazon. . . . [Notably] the U.S.-Peru bilateral plan to address
specific challenges in Peru’s forestry sector, lack[s] time frames
and performance indicators to assess progress.237

A previous GAO report on four other FTAs with Jordan, Chile,
Singapore, and Morocco was released in 2009. 238 While these
agreements did not have nearly as ambitious environmental provisions,
the GAO observed that, while significant progress had been made on
lowering tariffs and increasing government transparency, progress on
the environmental objectives was less successful:
The selected partners have improved their environmental laws
and made other progress, such as establishment of an
environmental ministry and a 400-strong environmental law
enforcement force in Jordan, according to U.S. and foreign
officials. However, partner officials report that enforcement
remains a challenge, and U.S. assistance has been limited.
Elements needed for assuring partner progress remain absent.
Notably, USTR’s lack of compliance plans and sporadic
monitoring, State’s lax management of environmental projects,
and U.S. agencies’ inaction to translate environmental
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commitments into reliable funding all limited efforts to promote
progress.239

These observations are echoed in much of the literature reviewing the
success of the NAFTA environmental side agreements. 240 The key
criticisms are that the U.S. government neglected to take the initiative to
investigate and enforce compliance of the environmental obligations
and that there was insufficient allocation of funds to assist in
environmental compliance. Gallagher notes that, while Article 22 of
NAFTA provides for a dispute resolution process with punitive
measures against a party that has “persistently fail[ed] to enforce
environmental law,” this Article has never been exercised.241
Gallagher argues that environmentalists, instead of turning away
from free trade entirely, should instead push for increased participation
of developed countries to support (financially and otherwise) the
fledgling environmental institutions of developing nations. “During the
NAFTA debates the international community ‘demanded’ that Mexico
do more to protect its environment, but only ended up allocating a paltry
$3 million per annum to that end.”242 A former USTR official expressed
the same sentiment: “On the cooperation dimension it’s important that
adequate funding is provided. We need the resources to provide both a
carrot and a stick.”243
The increased resources spent on implementing domestic reforms in
order to come into compliance with a BIT or FTA are necessarily not
being spent elsewhere within the developing state. Is it a good idea to
allow the U.S. and E.U. to set the environmental priorities of other
nations? One view may be that the support provided for the
implementation of these environmental laws can only help bolster
environmental governance in the trade partner. However, a competing
view is that these reforms displace those that would have otherwise
developed in a grassroots fashion spearheaded by stakeholders on the
ground. Rodrik has shown that the process of meeting the requirement
for integrating into an economic system, like the WTO or NAFTA, can
be extremely costly for a developing nation.244 The cost of compliance
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with external norms can “crowd out” other government spending
priorities, such as education and public health.245
An analogy can be made to the question of whether the availability of
international arbitration helps or hurts the development of the domestic
adjudication system of a host state. Ginsburg, using empirical analysis,
finds that the dispute resolution provided for under bilateral investment
treaties are substitutes, rather than complements, for domestic
institutions, and lead to overall reductions in the quality of governance
over time.246
VII. CONCLUSION
The practices presented in this paper can be seen as great
achievements of negotiation and diplomacy. The domestic
environmental lobby in the U.S. has been successful in shaping an
international legal mechanism that has the power to counter at least
some of the harmful environmental impacts of trade liberalization. The
obligation, precision, and enforcement of otherwise weak multilateral
environmental agreements and soft law principles are increased through
a process of legalization of international environmental protection.
These new environmental provisions increase the obligation upon states
to create and enforce environmental laws; they often describe, with
great precision, just how these laws are to be implemented; and they
increase the amount of delegation given to third parties to determine
compliance and resolve disputes.
These innovations could also be seen as a necessary broadening of
the scope of international trade and investment law. Odumosu, for
example, has argued that the investor state dispute settlement system,
and ICSID in particular, lacks legitimacy because it is limited by its
“single economic rationale for investment protection” that is unable, or
unwilling, to take into account alternative interests.247 The recognition of
environmental law in the text of BITs is an attempt by states to expand
the interests that are, at the least, not trampled by international dispute
resolution and, at the most, enforced by it.
However, these linkages come with some cost, as can be seen from
the presentation of the fallout over the implementation of the Forest
Annex of the U.S.-Peru FTA. There are serious threats to state
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sovereignty if powers such as the United States are able to use their
economic might to force domestic legal action from their trade partners
in areas that are only tangentially related to trade. It was no coincidence
that CITES was the MEA enforced the most aggressively and the MEA
that
received
the
widest
domestic
U.S.
support—from
environmentalists, but also the American timber lobby.
Peru’s enforcement of CITES following the signing of the FTA can
be seen as proof that “economic interdependence can be leveraged to
help manage real political conflict.” 248 However, one can wonder
whether this “leverage” is, in fact, plain coercion and whether or not
there is anything wrong with that (a legal realist would likely say no).
The very fact that the incorporation of environmental obligations occurs
more frequently, and to a great degree, in FTAs rather than in BITs tells
a story. The United States is able to get more of what it wants in an FTA
precisely because it has more to offer. BITs are less successful
bargaining arenas partially because the U.S. already maintains an
extremely open investment environment.249
A further concern rising out of these trade/environment linkages is
that international treaties may contain a package of provisions that
individually would never be adopted through the democratic political
processes of the states that ratify them. From one perspective, that
insight represents the beauty of international negotiation: the interaction
between Level I and Level II preferences leads to trade-offs (issue
linkages) that could not otherwise have been achieved on the domestic
level. A different take is that trade and investment agreements allow
leaders to circumvent the Level II domestic process to the detriment of
democracy and transparency. This concern was apparent in the rapid
passage of the Peruvian Ninety-nine Decrees, claimed to be necessary to
implement the Forest Annex of the U.S.-Peru TPA.
It is clear that the question is not whether trade and environment are
linked—because they are—but instead how to best promote global
economic growth and a clean environment for the long term. As Destler
writes, “[L]inking labor standards to trade agreements is entirely
legitimate in a world where globalization is putting increased stress on
domestic economic arrangements. . . . To say it is legitimate, of course,
does not mean it is effective, at least in the near term.”250
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